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LEARNING FROM PAST MISTAKES: FUTURE 
REGULATION TO PREVENT 
GREENWASHING 
Nick Feinstein* 
Abstract: The term “greenwashing” refers to false or misleading envi-
ronmental claims in advertising. This Note gives an overview of various 
laws that may be applied to greenwashers and the “Green Guides,” the 
Federal Trade Commission’s nonbinding guidance covering the applica-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission Act to environmental claims. This 
Note argues that greenwashing is a persistent problem for consumers and 
the environment and that existing laws are not sufficient to prevent it. It 
suggests that additional federal regulation is needed to curb greenwash-
ing, and that regulation should specifically define terms and be uniform 
across the country. Unlike the Green Guides, future greenwashing regula-
tion should be binding and enforceable. 
Introduction 
 In 1991, Mobil Corporation agreed to stop advertising its Hefty 
brand plastic trash bags as biodegradable and pay twenty-five thousand 
dollars each to six states that had sued the company for making such 
claims.1 The settlement marked the end of an advertising campaign 
that Mobil initiated in 1988, aimed at selling its products to environ-
mentally conscious consumers.2 By claiming that Hefty trash bags were 
degradable, Mobil had attempted to capitalize on a growing concern 
among consumers regarding the polluting effects of plastic waste dis-
posal.3 It could not, however, provide proof of the environmental bene-
fit of its products.4 Environmental groups publicly criticized the com-
                                                                                                                      
* Articles Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2012–2013. 
1 Mobil Settles on Hefty Bags, N.Y. Times, June 28, 1991, at D4. 
2 Jed Greer, Biodegradability Scam, International Plastics Task Force (1992), http:// 
www.ecologycenter.org/iptf/plastic_types/bioscam.html. 
3 Id.; see Jennifer Stoffel, What’s New in Plastics; Polishing Their Image with Consumers, Even 
First Graders, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1989, at F13. 
4 See New Study Challenges ‘Biodegradable’ Claims, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1991, at C4. 
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pany for misleading consumers, and several states responded by bring-
ing suit.5 
 Mobil was not alone in using green marketing to attract consum-
ers.6 Heightened public attention to the environment in the late 1980s 
created a new breed of consumer who demanded environmentally re-
sponsible products.7 Almost overnight, green consumerism trans-
formed the niche market for ecologically safe products into a main-
stream industry.8 The business community responded with a wave of 
marketing campaigns directed at environmentally conscious purchas-
ers.9 Like Mobil, however, many corporations advertised environmental 
benefits that could not be substantiated.10 Thus began the concern 
among environmental groups and lawmakers over false or misleading 
claims in green marketing, often referred to as greenwashing.11 
 The controversy stirred by Mobil and other similar incidents of 
greenwashing drew the attention of the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) and state lawmakers.12 Ten state attorneys general formed a task 
force to address the issue, reporting their findings and advice to the 
FTC in “The Green Report” and “The Green Report II.”13 The FTC 
responded by issuing the Guides for the Use of Environmental Market-
ing Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”) to assist marketers in avoiding 
deceptive advertising claims under the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTC Act”).14 
 Not satisfied with the FTC’s nonbinding Green Guides, environ-
mental groups called unsuccessfully for the EPA to promulgate specific 
                                                                                                                      
5 Carol Jouzaitis, Mobil to Drop ‘Degradable’ Claim on Bags, Chi. Trib., Mar. 30, 1990, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1990-03-30/business/9001260345_1_degradable-plastics- 
mobil-officials-hefty; Mobil Settles on Hefty Bags, supra note 1. 
6 See Stoffel, supra note 3. 
7 Connie Koenenn, To Market, to Market—With a Mission: Environment: Yesterday They 
Were Yuppies; Today They Are ‘Green Consumers’ Who Are Demanding Goods That Are Ecologically 
Safe, L.A. Times, Mar. 15, 1990, http://articles.latimes.com/1990-03-15/news/vw-42_1_ 
green-consumer. 
8 See id. 
9 Cal. Attorney Gen., et al., The Green Report: Findings and Preliminary Rec-
ommendations for Responsible Environmental Advertising 1 (1990) (calling green 
marketing “the marketing craze of the 1990’s”). 
10 See id. 
11 See id.; Stuart Elliott, CBS Accused of ‘Greenwashing,’ N.Y. Times (Apr. 14, 2011, 5:13 
PM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/14/cbs-accused-of-greenwashing. 
12 Keith Schneider, Guides on Environmental Ad Claims, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1992, at D3. 
13 Cal. Attorney Gen., et al., The Green Report II: Recommendations for Re-
sponsible Environmental Advertising (1991) (an eleventh state, Tennessee, joined in 
The Green Report II); Cal. Attorney Gen., et al., supra note 9. 
14 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2012). 
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regulations with the force of law.15 Despite calls for a national scheme 
of greenwashing prevention, Congress failed to authorize federal regu-
lation of green marketing.16 Therefore, consumers and environmental-
ists must rely on the Green Guides and a patchwork of state and federal 
consumer protection statutes as their sole defense against greenwash-
ing.17 
 This Note argues that existing laws inadequately protect consumers 
and the environment from the harmful effects of greenwashing. Part I 
describes the growth of greenwashing and its consequences.18 Part II 
provides an overview of existing regulations that are applied to the 
problem,19 and Part III discusses the Green Guides and their enforce-
ment.20 Part IV addresses the deficiencies in existing regulations and 
offers a framework for a potential solution.21 It proposes that Congress 
authorize the FTC and EPA to promulgate uniform and specific stan-
dards for environmental marketing.22 This Note further suggests giving 
environmentalists and consumers the ability to sue alleged greenwash-
ers.23 
I. Greenwashing: Background 
A. The Rise of Environmental Marketing 
 Increased media attention to environmental issues beginning in 
the late 1980s heightened environmental awareness among American 
consumers.24 Surveys conducted in the early 1990s revealed a large ma-
jority of Americans worried about the environment and were willing to 
alter their purchasing behaviors to benefit environmental quality.25 
Rather than relying on government regulation as the sole means of en-
                                                                                                                      
15 See Schneider, supra note 12. 
16 See K. Alexandra McClure, Comment, Environmental Marketing: A Call for Legislative 
Action, 35 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1351, 1361−62 (1995) (describing the Senate’s failure to 
pass proposed legislation that would have given the EPA authority to regulate environ-
mental marketing terminology). 
17 See infra notes 73–195 and accompanying text. See generally Robert B. White, Note, 
Preemption in Green Marketing: The Case for Uniform Federal Marketing Definitions, 85 Ind. L.J. 
325 (2010) (discussing various laws that have been used against greenwashing). 
18 See infra notes 24–72 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 73–131 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 132–195 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 196–277 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 258–265 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 266–269 and accompanying text. 
24 See U.S. EPA, Assessing the Environmental Consumer Market 3 (1991). 
25 Id. 
232 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:229 
vironmental protection, consumers began to believe that individuals 
could help the environment through their own actions.26 Conse-
quently, companies engaged in selling goods and services quickly capi-
talized on the rapidly growing marketplace for ecologically friendly 
rod
tity 
f pr
nd Heinz’s promise to avoid harm to 
olp
                                                                                                                     
p ucts.27 
 As a result, environmental marketing grew exponentially in the 
1990s, as corporations injected environmental considerations into both 
their product development and advertising campaigns.28 In the last 
twenty years, environmental marketing has only continued to grow.29 
The last few years have seen an especially dramatic jump in the quan
o oducts marketed to consumers under environmental claims.30 
 Currently, advertisers use green marketing to sell a wide range of 
products in the United States, from “carbon-efficient” cars to “biode-
gradable” laundry detergent.31 Often, the premium that consumers pay 
to switch to the eco-friendly version of certain products is only a mar-
ginal price increase from one brand to another.32 The rise of green 
marketing thus creates competition among companies to raise the en-
vironmental standards of their production.33 Additionally, it raises 
awareness among consumers who are increasingly exposed to environ-
mental advertisements.34 Early signs that consumer awareness had be-
gun to affect industry practices included McDonalds’ switch from foam 
containers to paper wrapping a
d hins during tuna fishing.35 
 The willingness of consumers to adjust their purchasing decisions 
theoretically provides a significant avenue for improving the environ-
 
ailable at http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/greenwashing-report-2010 
(fin
nda A. Goldstein, “Green” Is So Appealing, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 
15, ilable at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=120242449 
338
nn Israel, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for 
Env C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 303, 304 (1993). 
4. 
26 Id. at 4. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 2. 
29 See Timothy C. Bradley, Likelihood of Eco-Friendly Confusion, Landslide, Sept.–Oct. 
2011, at 39, 39. 
30 See TerraChoice Grp. Inc., The Sins of Greenwashing: Home and Family Edition 
6, 11 (2010), av
ding the marketing of green products increased 79% from 2008 to 2009 and 73% from 
2009 to 2010). 
31 See Christopher A. Cole & Li
2008, ava
7&slreturn=20130028170304. 
32 Id. 
33 Gle
ironmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.
34 Id. 
35 U.S. EPA, supra note 24, at 
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ment while avoiding additional government regulation.36 Unfortunately, 
consumers rarely have the resources to verify marketers’ environmental 
assertions.37 Among the wash of green marketing claims, many are false, 
misleading, or unsubstantiated.38 Green advertising is thus emerging as 
one of the most prominent concerns for groups that monitor the adver-
tising industry.39 
t issue environmental 
     
B. Definition of Greenwashing 
 Rising concerns over environmental marketing claims going un-
substantiated led environmental advocates and media to coin the term 
“greenwashing.”40 The term refers to false or misleading representation 
that products, brands, or corporate practices are beneficial to the envi-
ronment.41 Scholars and environmental organizations define a broad 
range of practices as greenwashing, including false assertions and 
claims that exaggerate, misdirect, or mislead consumers as to the envi-
ronmental qualities of a product.42 These organizations even level ac-
cusations of greenwashing against companies tha
claims that are simply too vague or ambiguous.43 
 Under the most inclusive definition, greenwashing is nearly ubiq-
uitous.44 A 2010 study conducted by TerraChoice, a private environ-
mental marketing firm, found that over ninety-five percent of the green 
products analyzed were guilty of some form of greenwashing.45 The 
same study identified common greenwashing practices: the most fre-
                                                                                                                 
36 Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10 
Yal  Reg. 147, 150 (1993). 
 (London), May 1, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/ 
200 responsibility.ethicalliving (citing report that “the number 
of c ints on advertiser’s green claims became one of the two key emerging issues for 
con
 note 11. 
raChoice Grp. Inc., supra note 30, at 10 (listing the seven “Sins of 
Gre
actice.” Id. 
e J. on
37 Id. (“Shortcomings in the current legal and regulatory system have allowed manu-
facturers to make misleading and unsubstantiated claims with virtual impunity.”). 
38 Id. 
39 See Will Ashley-Cantello, Advertising Watchdog Receives Record Complaints over Corporate 
‘Greenwash,’ Guardian
8/may/01/corporatesocial
ompla
sumers in 2007”). 
40 Elliott, supra
41 Id. 
42 See, e.g., Ter
enwashing”). 
43 See, e.g., id. 
44 See id. at 16. 
45 Id. TerraChoice’s analysis accounted for the Green Guides, the Canadian Competi-
tion Bureau Guidelines for Environmental Claims, and TerraChoice’s “own understanding 
of global best pr
234 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:229 
quent error advertisers committed in 2010 was the “sin of no proof,”46 
followed closely by that of vagueness.47 The fastest-growing greenwash-
ing trend found by TerraChoice was “giv[ing] the impression of third-
rt
 their resources while taking credit for re-
ci
pa y endorsement where no such endorsement actually exists.”48 
 Since the rise of greenwashing, organizations like TerraChoice, 
Greenpeace, and the Center for Environmental Health have monitored 
the issue and brought it to the public’s attention.49 In the process, 
greenwashing reports have singled out several high profile compa-
nies.50 For example, in 2010 a blogger for Greenpeace accused Shell of 
seeking to open risky oil drilling locations while running an aggressive 
advertising campaign asserting their aim to be environmentally respon-
sible and fuel-efficient.51 Similarly, Kimberly-Clark (the producer of 
Kleenex tissues) achieved notoriety in 2009 for cutting down two-
hundred-year-old forests for
du ng carbon emissions.52 
 Recently, CBS Corporation received accusations of greenwashing 
after it unveiled its “EcoAd” campaign.53 The initiative encourages 
other companies to purchase advertisements through CBS media, with 
a portion of the proceeds devoted to local environmental causes.54 For 
participating in the program, marketers accrue the added benefit of 
the EcoAd logo (the phrase “EcoAd” combined with a picture of green 
leaves) appearing on their advertisements.55 The problem, environ-
mental groups claim, is that any advertiser can participate in the EcoAd 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. at 10, 16 (categorizing the sin of no proof as “an environmental claim that can-
not be substantiated by easily accessible supporting information or by a reliable third-party 
cert
ly defined or broad 
that
at 10, 16 (finding a rise from 23.3% of all 
pro
. 
g; Greenwashing, Green 
pea
bers.greenpeace.org/blog/greenwashing/ 
201
ctic Ads, supra note 50. 
. 
supra note 11. 
ification”). 
47 Id. (categorizing the sin of vagueness as a “claim that is so poor
 its real meaning is likely to be misunderstood by the consumer”). 
48 TerraChoice Grp. Inc., supra note 30, 
ducts evaluated in 2009 to 30.9% in 2010). 
49 Id. at 5; Press Release, Ctr. for Envtl. Health, EcoAds Confuse Consumers, Promote 
Greenwashing, Groups Charge in FTC Complaint (Apr. 12, 2011), available at http://www
ceh.org/making-news/press-releases/29-eliminating-toxics/516-consumer-and-environmen 
tal-watchdogs-charge-cbs-ecoad-program-with-deceptive-greenwashin
ce, http://www.stopgreenwash.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
50 See, e.g., Ariel Schwartz, Kimberly Clark: Destroyer of Ancient Trees, Energy Star Partner of the 
Year?, Fast Company (Mar. 13, 2009, 1:00 PM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1210785/ 
kimberly-clark-destroyer-ancient-trees-energy-star-partner-year; Don’t Be Fooled by Shell’s Arctic 
Ads, Greenpeace (Nov. 15, 2010), http://mem
0/11/15/don-t-be-fooled-by-shell-s-arctic-ads. 
51 Don’t Be Fooled by Shell’s Ar
52 Schwartz, supra note 50
53 Elliott, 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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program regardless of the quality of their environmental perform-
ance.56 Thus, a company with an unfavorable environmental record 
may still obtain the goodwill of environmentally conscious viewers who 
are n
tal and private 
to
ashing, the perpetrators’ costs of mitigating 
ega
                                                                                                                     
ot aware of the program’s details.57 
C. Potential Consequences of Greenwashing and Private Efforts to Prevent It 
 The negative effects of greenwashing on consumers and the envi-
ronment are well documented.58 Consumer awareness creates a market 
for environmentally sound products, which companies can tap into for 
their own profit.59 Many commentators, however, recognize that the 
potential benefit of green marketing is undercut when accompanied by 
false or inaccurate information.60 Thus, both governmen
ac rs have sought to reduce false and misleading claims to maintain an 
efficient and truthful marketplace for green products.61 
 In addition to regulatory schemes that address greenwashing ei-
ther directly or indirectly, some private organizations attempt to police 
greenwashers.62 Environmental watchdog organizations, for example, 
are helpful in reducing consumer confusion and holding greenwashers 
responsible for their claims.63 When such groups successfully alert the 
public to acts of greenw
n tive publicity often outweigh the green marketing benefits, provid-
ing a deterrent effect.64 
 In addition to these limited means of prevention, third-party certi-
fication organizations provide a market-based incentive for companies 
to make only legitimate environmental claims.65 Under these certifica-
tion systems, third parties assess the environmental effects of compa-
 
elease, Ctr. for Envtl. Health, supra note 49. 
 a pro-
found negative impact on the longer-term growth of the environmental market.”). 
h accurate information about the 
envi
rtising: Its Fu-
ture 55, 172–80 (1992). 
 
the 
reen Is Good . . . Until “Eco-Friendly” 
Beco 9, at 39, 42. 
. 
56 Press R
57 See id. 
58 See U.S. EPA, supra note 24, at 6 (“Overreaching product claims may have
59 See id. 
60 Israel, supra note 33 (“The free market system can have a positive effect on the envi-
ronment only if manufacturers provide consumers wit
ronmental impact of their purchasing decisions.”). 
61 See Thomas C. Downs, Comment, “Environmentally Friendly” Product Adve
Requires a New Regulatory Authority, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1
62 See id.; infra notes 52–131 and accompanying text. 
63 See, e.g., The Green Life, Don’t Be Fooled 2012: The Worst Greenwashers (2012), 
available at http://thegreenlifeblog.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/dbf-report.pdf (describing
“rhetoric” versus the “reality” of ten environmental advertising campaigns). 
64 See Victoria Davis Lockard & Joshua L. Becker, G
mes “Eco-Fraud,” For the Def., Feb. 200
65 See Downs, supra note 61, at 173
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nies that generally lack the incentive and expertise for self-evaluation.66 
In other countries, governmental and quasi-governmental accredita-
tion programs have assumed this third-party role to keep consumers 
informed regarding the environmental impact of certain products.67 
he
l-
though voluntary certification programs offer a carrot for ecologically 
friendly co laims.72 
Commission Act (“FTC Act”),74 to environmental claims, are discussed 
                                                                                                                     
T  United States, however, does not have a comprehensive national 
labeling system.68 
 In the United States, private organizations such as Green Seal and 
Scientific Certification Systems provide labeling programs that closely 
monitor their participants’ environmental practices and reward busi-
nesses with labels that educate consumers and entice the environmen-
tally conscious among them.69 Currently, the most prominent govern-
ment-backed program in the United States is the EPA’s ENERGY STAR 
Program, which lends a stamp of approval to electronic products that 
achieve certain levels of energy efficiency.70 ENERGY STAR is successful 
in helping consumers to identify energy-saving products that not only 
benefit consumers by lowering their utility bills, but ultimately benefit 
the environment through reduced greenhouse gas emissions.71 A
mpanies, they do not provide a stick to deter false c
II. Regulation of Environmental Marketing 
 Because of the broad scope of environmental marketing, green-
washing claims can fall under various laws and regulations. The Guides 
for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides” or 
“Guides”),73 which directly address the application of the Federal Trade 
 
66 Grodsky, supra note 36, at 193. 
67 Downs, supra note 61, at 172–73 & n.73 (noting Germany’s Blue Angel environ-
mental certification program as the first of its kind); see U.S. EPA, Environmental Label-
ing Issues, Policies, and Practices Worldwide 15 (1998). 
68 U.S. EPA, supra note 67. 
69 Jennifer Woods, Comment, Of Selling the Environment—Buyer Beware? An Evaluation of 
the Proposed F.T.C. Green Guides Revisions, 21 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 75, 78–80 (2008); see 
Green Seal, http://greenseal.org (last visited Jan. 16, 2013); Scientific Certification 
Sys., http://scscertified.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2013). 
70 U.S. EPA, ENERGY STAR and Other Climate Protection Partnerships Annual 
Report 2 (2008). 
71 Id. 
72 See Downs, supra note 61, at 173 (“[P]rivate certification programs do not present 
the kind of comprehensive, reliable system for policing the advertising marketplace that is 
necessary to ensure trustworthy environmental advertising.”). 
73 16 C.F.R. pt. 260 (2012). 
74 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
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in Part III of this Note. There are other statutes, however, which do not 
specifically address greenwashing, including the Organic Foods Pro-
duction Act (OFPA)75 and the Lanham Act,76 which may also apply. 
DA seal to products that meet the 
rga
                                                                                                                     
A. The USDA’s Organic Certification Standards 
 Although companies can often use descriptive environmental 
terms like “sustainable,” “eco-friendly,” or “green” in advertising without 
drawing much scrutiny, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
strictly regulates the use of the word “organic.”77 The OFPA specifically 
prohibits the marketing of domestic agricultural products as organically 
produced, except in conformity with the USDA’s national standards.78 
The law also limits the use of the US
o nic certification requirements.79 
 The National Organic Program (NOP) lays out the USDA’s par-
ticular standards for organic certification.80 The NOP contains detailed 
regulations regarding production and handling practices that agricul-
tural producers must follow to maintain organic certification.81 Addi-
tionally, it prohibits the involvement of certain substances with products 
that will be marketed as organic.82 The NOP regulates products in four 
levels of organic content.83 Products under the USDA’s jurisdiction, 
“sold, labeled, or represented as ‘100 percent organic’ must contain . . . 
100 percent organically produced ingredients.”84 The threshold for 
products represented as simply “organic” is 95% organic content.85 
 
75 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6523 (2006). 
76 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(a), 1125 (2006). 
77 See 7 U.S.C. § 6505. See generally Jennifer M. Hetu & Anessa Owen Kramer, It’s Not 
Easy Being Green: Use of the Terms “Organic,” “Sustainable,” and “Natural” in Trademarks and 
Advertising, Landslide, Sept.–Oct. 2011, at 46, 47. 
78 7 U.S.C. § 6505(a). Section (b) similarly prohibits selling or labeling imported agri-
cultural products as organic unless they are certified under standards that are at least 
equivalent to the USDA’s. Id. § 6505(b). Sections (c) and (d) create exemptions for certain 
processed foods and for products sold by small farmers. Id. § 6505 (c)–(d). 
79 Id. § 6505(a)(2). 
80 7 C.F.R. pt. 205 (2012). 
81 Id. §§ 205.200–.290. For instance, the NOP mandates that “[p]roduction practices 
implemented in accordance with this subpart must maintain or improve the natural re-
sources of the operation, including soil and water quality.” Id. § 205.200. 
82 Id. § 205.105. 
83 Id. § 205.301. 
84 Id. § 205.301(a). 
85 Id. § 205.301(b) (“Any remaining product ingredients must be organically pro-
duced, unless not commercially available in organic form, or must be nonagricultural sub-
stances or nonorganically produced agricultural products produced consistent with the 
National List.”). 
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Products whose ingredients are at least 70% organically produced may 
be labeled as “made with organic [ingredients].”86 Finally, marketing of 
products containing less than 70% approved organic components may 
not include the term organic except to indicate individual organic in-
red
ovides for fines up to ten thousand dol-
rs f
 of the NOP as well as its oversight of im-
ort
                                                                                                                     
g ients, and then only under certain limitations.87 
 Agricultural producers wishing to gain organic certification under 
the NOP must plan for an organic production or handling system and 
submit to an initial inspection and subsequent annual inspections to 
ensure continued compliance.88 The USDA may suspend or revoke cer-
tifications for noncompliance, and civil penalties can be imposed for 
knowingly marketing products as organic without meeting the legal 
requirements.89 The OFPA pr
la or such misrepresentation.90 
 The OFPA is not without weaknesses.91 Though it creates a uni-
form set of standards for organic production, some critics recognize 
the ill effect that special interests have on limitations and exemptions 
in the regulations.92 Some commentators also accuse the NOP of being 
too lax in certain areas, thus lending credibility to producers who 
would otherwise be considered greenwashers.93 Further, critics attack 
the USDA for its enforcement
p ed organic products.94 
 Still, the strict national standards set by the NOP are recognized as 
a contributing factor in the vast proliferation of organic farming prac-
tices in the United States and internationally since the OFPA’s enact-
ment.95 As companies have rushed to capitalize on growing demand for 
organic products, the NOP has facilitated informed consumers’ pur-
 
(2012). 
305. 
 Regulations; Natural Selection?; Federal Rules Limit the ‘Or-
gan
n. J. Int’l L. 333, 378 (2011). 
86 7 C.F.R. § 205.301(c) 
87 Id. §§ 205.304–.
88 Id. §§ 205.401, .403. 
89 Id. § 205.662. 
90 7 U.S.C. § 6519(a) (2006). 
91 See, e.g., Blake M. Mensing, USDA Organic: Ecopornography or a Label Worth Searching 
For?, Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y, Fall 2008, at 24, 24. 
92 See, e.g., Elizabeth Allen, Food
ic’ Label, but Set Off Loophole Hunts, San Antonio Express-News, May 21, 2003, at 1E, 
available at 2003 WLNR 16739581. 
93 See, e.g., Mensing, supra note 91 (criticizing the USDA for allowing certain synthetic 
substances, including nitrites and nitrates, in organic-labeled meat). 
94 Chenglin Liu, Is “USDA ORGANIC” a Seal of Deceit?: The Pitfalls of USDA Certified Or-
ganics Produced in the United States, China and Beyond, 47 Sta
95 Donald T. Hornstein, The Road Also Taken: Lessons from Organic Agriculture for Market- 
and Risk-Based Regulation, 56 Duke L.J. 1541, 1551 (2007). 
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chasing decisions by legitimizing the claims of certified producers.96 
The organic market’s consistent growth, which held constant around 
twenty percent annually from 1990 to 2005, demonstrates that some 
consumers rely on organic labeling and are willing to pay the premium 
usually associated with organic goods.97 
mercial activities.”98 A suc-
cessf
ween the challenged statements and harm to 
B. The Lanham Act and False Advertising 
 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes civil liability for advertis-
ing that “misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin of . . . goods, services, or com
ul claim generally proves five elements: 
1) [T]he defendant has made false or misleading statements 
of fact concerning his own product or another’s; 2) the state-
ment . . . deceive[s] a substantial portion of the intended au-
dience; 3) the statement . . . will likely influence the deceived 
consumer’s purchasing decisions; 4) the advertisements were 
introduced into interstate commerce; and 5) there is some 
causal link bet
the plaintiff.99 
 The Act, though it does not specifically address green marketing, 
has in some cases been an effective tool for companies in rooting out 
greenwashing by their competitors.100 For example, Vermont Pure sued 
a competitor, Nestlé, owner of the Poland Spring bottled water brand, 
alleging violations of section 43(a) in 2006.101 In addition to question-
ing the source and purity of Poland Spring water, Vermont Pure ac-
cused Nestlé of contaminating ground and well water with its methods 
                                                                                                                      
96 Kate L. Harrison, Comment, Organic Plus: Regulating Beyond the Current Organic Stan-
ated consumer confusion,” but asserting that the NOP has failed to meet its 
obje
v., RL 31595, Organic Agriculture in 
the 
cians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric 
Surg Cir. 1999). 
rs N. Am., Inc., No. Civ.A.03-11465 DPW, 2006 
WL , at *2 (D. Mass. Mar. 28, 2006). 
dards, 25 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 211, 221 (2008) (noting that organic certification standards 
have “elimin
ctive). 
97 See Jean M. Rawson, Cong. Research Ser
U.S.: Program and Policy Issues 2 (2005). 
98 Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). 
99 Am. Council of Certified Podiatric Physi
ery, Inc., 185 F.3d 606, 613 (6th 
100 White, supra note 17, at 330. 
101 Vt. Pure Holdings, Ltd. v. Nestlé Wate
839486
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of production.102 Ultimately, Nestlé settled with its competitor, paying 
Vermont Pure $750,000.103 
 Static Control Components also raised a section 43(a) claim against 
a competitor, Lexmark, a printer supply company, alleging Lexmark’s 
ink cartridge recycling program did not live up to its marketing.104 
Lexmark’s “Environmental Program” allowed customers to return used 
cartridges to the company for recycling or reuse.105 “Hundreds of thou-
sands” of those cartridges, however, ended up being incinerated, a prac-
ce 
petitive interests 
have standing under section 43(a), and thus consumers are ex-
cluded.109 Therefo n is reserved as a 
cti
ing ade-
mar fore 
refu on 2(a), the USPTO or 
Trad s: 
       
ti referred to by Lexmark as “thermal[] recycling.”106 The court de-
nied summary judgment against Lexmark, allowing the jury to decide 
whether incineration qualified as recycling per the company’s environ-
mental marketing claims.107 
 Although section 43(a) provides a mean for companies to police 
one another with regard to greenwashing, consumers generally cannot 
bring their own false advertising claims under the Lanham Act.108 For 
the most part, only parties with commercial or com
re, except in rare cases, the provisio
ta c for business competitors, rather than providing direct relief for 
consumers who have been misled by greenwashing.110 
C. Prohibition of Deceptive Trademarks 
 Similar to section 43(a)’s general prohibition of false and mislead-
advertising, section 2(a) bars the registration of deceptive tr
ks with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).111 Be
sing registration of a mark under secti
emark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) must make three inquirie
                                                                                                               
102 Id. 
103 Cole & Goldstein, supra note 31. 
104 Static Control Components, Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 861, 885 
(E.D. Ky. 2007). 
105 Id. at 871. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 887, 891 (“There appears to be significant factual disputes as to whether 
technically or effectively incineration [sic] would support a claim that Lexmark recycles its 
returned cartridges.”). 
108 White, supra note 17, at 330. 
109 Tawnya Wojciechowski, Comment, Letting Consumers Stand on Their Own: An Argu-
ment for Congressional Action Regarding Consumer Standing for False Advertising Under Lanham 
Act Section 43(a), 24 Sw. U. L. Rev. 213, 215 (1994); see Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a) (2006). 
110 See Wojciechowski, supra note 109. 
111 See Lanham Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a). 
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(1) Is the term misdescriptive of the character, quality, func-
tion, composition or use of the goods? 
ts were made of organically 
grown cotton, which some prefer over conventional cotton.118 Al-
though its scope is limited to stration, section 2(a) of the 
anh
against false advertising.120 Section 5 of the Act gives the Federal Trade 
Co t “[u]nfair methods 
                                                                                                                     
(2) If so, are prospective purchasers likely to believe that the 
misdescription actually describes the goods? 
(3) If so, is the misdescription likely to affect the decision to 
purchase?112 
Superior quality, health benefit, and conformance with social policy are 
examples of attributes the USPTO usually considers likely to affect pur-
chasing decisions.113 
 The USPTO has generally treated environmental terms such as 
“organic,” “sustainable,” and “natural” as potentially deceptive when 
attributed to products that do not fit the bill.114 In Bayer Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Stamatios Mouratidis, for example, Bayer opposed registration of the 
mark “Organic Aspirin” to identify a dietary supplement that was nei-
ther organic nor aspirin.115 The TTAB agreed that the mark was decep-
tive, and refused its registration.116 Similarly, in Organik Technologies Inc., 
the TTAB found a clothing company’s mark, “Organik,” to be decep-
tive.117 The board found the mark would likely lead consumers to mis-
takenly believe that the company’s produc
 trademark regi
L am Act thus provides another potential obstacle to greenwashing 
for companies who are not otherwise prevented by specific USDA regu-
lations or general false advertising laws.119 
D. The FTC Act 
 The FTC Act is the primary source of protection for consumers 
mmission (FTC) authority to take action agains
 
ay 21, 2010) (not precedential). 
 *6. The TTAB also found the mark to be “deceptively misdescriptive under 
Secti
t 49. 
112 In re Budge Mfg. Co., 857 F.2d 773, 775 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
113 Hetu & Kramer, supra note 77. 
114 Id. 
115 No. 91185473, 2010 WL 2191893, at *3 (T.T.A.B. M
116 Id. at
on 2(e)(1).” Id. 
117 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1690, 1694 (T.T.A.B. 1997). 
118 Id. 
119 See Hetu & Kramer, supra note 77, a
120 Grodsky, supra note 30, at 160 (calling the FTC Act “the principal federal vehicle 
for restraining deceptive advertising”); see 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006). 
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of competition . . . and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affect-
ing commerce,”121 a broad scope of activities that includes deceptive 
advertising.122 To succeed in a claim against a deceptive advertiser, the 
FTC must prove the likelihood that a reasonable consumer would be 
aracteristics of its milk cartons.127 In 1991, the FTC entered a 
vailable 
to consumers as a tool to prevent greenwashing.129 Rather, only the 
FTC can bring sectio .130 The FTC there-
re
                                                                                                                     
misled, though it need not show actual deception.123 Further, the mis-
information must be material—that is, it must somehow affect the con-
sumer’s purchasing decisions.124 
 The FTC generally prosecutes deceptive advertising claims on a 
case-by-case basis, and has asserted a number of claims involving envi-
ronmental marketing.125 In 1973, the FTC took action against Ex-Cell-
O Corporation, which inaccurately marketed its plastic-lined milk car-
tons as “completely biodegradable.”126 The result was a consent order 
for Ex-Cell-O to cease and desist from misrepresenting the environ-
mental ch
similar order against Zipatone, Inc. for advertising its spray cement 
product as environmentally safe when it contained a Class I ozone-
depleting substance.128 
 Like section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the FTC Act is not a
n 5 deceptive advertising claims
fo  assumes the role of watchdog over consumers’ interests.131 
III. The FTC’s Green Guides 
 In response to the expanding prevalence of environmental mar-
keting and the growing concern over greenwashing, a task force com-
 
121 FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
5) (“Through both Commission in-
terp
false, deceptive and misleading advertising claims.”). 
ll Cosmetics, 
U.S. hibiting company from marketing hairspray 
con pleting substances as “ozone safe” or “ozone friendly”). 
8 Zipatone, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 376 (1991). 
) (2006); supra notes 98–110 and accompanying 
text
122 E. Howard Barnett, Green with Envy: The FTC, the EPA, the States, and the Regulation of 
Environmental Marketing, 1 Envtl. Law. 491, 495 (199
retation and judicial decree, the Commission’s authority extends to the regulation of 
123 Grodsky, supra note 36, at 153 (citing Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984)). 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 154; see, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 577 F.2d 653, 655 
(9th Cir. 1978) (affirming with modifications an FTC order enjoining gas company from 
exaggerating emissions reductions caused by its product); Jerome Russe
A., Inc., 114 F.T.C. 514, 521 (1991) (pro
taining ozone-de
126 Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36 (1973). 
127 Id. at 43–45. 
12
129 See FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2
. 
130 FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2). 
131 See Wojciechowski, supra note 109, at 229. 
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posed of states’ attorneys general issued “The Green Report” in 1989, 
calling for federal oversight of the issue.132 In 1992, after a second issu-
ance of the report and multiple public hearings, the Federal Trade 
tal marketing,136 and guidelines 
ga
of greenwashing be-
cause courts often defer to them in litigation of environmental 
claims.140 Some sta he Green Guides 
 dr
                               
Commission (FTC) released the FTC Guidelines for the Use of Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides” or “Guides”), a manual 
for compliance with environmental marketing standards.133 
 The Green Guides address “environmental marketing claims that 
are unfair or deceptive under Section 5 of the [Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act].”134 Their coverage includes “labeling, advertising, promo-
tional materials and all other forms of marketing in any medium,” and 
“claims about the environmental attributes of a product, package or 
service.”135 The content of the Guides consists of a series of general 
principles applying to all environmen
re rding specific terms, such as “biodegradable” or “recyclable.”137 
Throughout, the Guides provide illustrative examples to help market-
ers conform to the FTC standards.138 
 Although the Green Guides represent progress, they are merely 
administrative interpretations, and therefore do not have the force of 
law.139 Still, the Guides can be influential in cases 
tes have also used provisions from t
to aft their own consumer protection statutes.141 
                                                                                       
supra note 9; Lauren C. Avallone, Comment, Green Mar-
ketin or Federal Regulation, 14 Penn St. Envtl. L. Rev. 685, 688 (2006). 
he Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,363 (Aug. 
13, 1 one, supra note 132. 
s). 
rtain claims.”). 
latory Update—FTC Seeks Input on Green Marketing Guides, Agric. L. 
Upd
132 Cal. Attorney Gen., et al., 
g: The Urgent Need f
133 Guides for t
992) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260); Avall
134 16 C.F.R. § 260.1(a) (2012). 
135 Id. § 260.1(c). 
136 Id. § 260.3. 
137 E.g., id. § 260.12 (Recyclable Claim
138 Id. § 260.1(d) (“The examples provide the Commission’s views on how reasonable 
consumers likely interpret ce
139 Id. § 260.1(a) (“[The Guides] do not confer any rights on any person and do not 
operate to bind the FTC or the public.”). 
140 Tom Redick, Regu
ate, Aug. 2009, at 1, 4. 
141 Greg Northen, Greenwashing the Organic Label: Abusive Green Marketing in an Increas-
ingly Eco-Friendly Marketplace, 7 J. Food L. & Pol’y 101, 111 (2011); see infra notes 162–184 
and accompanying text. 
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A. 1998 Version of the Green Guides 
 After introducing the Green Guides in 1992, the FTC revised the 
Guides in 1996 and 1998.142 Following these revisions, the Green Guides 
included four general principles for green marketing.143 The first stated 
that all qualifications and disclosures “should be sufficiently clear, 
prominent and understandable to prevent deception.”144 Second, the 
Guides dictated that environmental marketing claims should be clear as 
to what they refer, whether it is a product, a specific component of the 
rod 145p uct, or just the packaging of the product.  The third principle 
advised against the overstatement of a product’s environmental bene-
fits.146 Finally, the fourth principle stated that comparative environ-
mental claims should clearly indicate the basis for comparison.147 
 Section 260.7(a) of the 1998 revision warned against making broad 
claims of environmental benefit that the company may not be able to 
substantiate.148 For example, the Guides advised businesses against us-
ing language such as “Environmentally Friendly” or “Earth Smart” with-
out qualification if they cannot substantiate the implied message to 
consumers that the associated product is environmentally superior to 
competing products.149  seven specific envi-
ronmental terms that tively, including “de-
rad
                                                                                                                     
 Section 260.7 identified
 should not be used decep
g able,”150 “compostable,” and “recyclable.”151 
 
142 Bradley, supra note 23, at 40. Two years after the FTC proposed further updates, 
ano
for the Use of Environmental Market-
ing  Although the Guides have been updated, the general 
prin anged significantly from the 1998 version. See 16 C.F.R. § 260.3 
(20 –195 and accompanying text. 
 260.6(d) (noting the preference of “20% more recycled content than our pre-
viou
011) (“An unqualified claim that a product or package is de-
grad
g five more. 16 C.F.R. §§ 260.5–.17 (2012). 
ther revision to the Guides was finally published on October 11, 2012. Guides for the 
Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 11, 2012) (codified at 
16 C.F.R. pt. 260); see infra notes 185–195 and accompanying text. 
143 16 C.F.R. § 260.6 (2011) (updated by Guides 
Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,122).
ciples have not ch
12); infra notes 185
144 16 C.F.R. § 260.6(a) (2011). 
145 Id. § 260.6(b). 
146 Id. § 260.6(c). 
147 Id. §
s package” over “20% more recycled content,” for example). 
148 Id. § 260.7(a). 
149 Id. 
150 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(b) (2
able, biodegradable or photodegradable should be substantiated by competent and 
reliable scientific evidence that the entire product or package will completely break down 
and return to nature . . . .”). 
151 Id. § 260.7(b)–(h). The remaining four terms were “recycled content,” “source re-
duction,” “refillable,” and “ozone safe/friendly.” Id. § 260.7(e)–(h). The 2012 update re-
tains these seven terms, while addin
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B. Green Guides Enforcement 
 After publishing the Green Guides in 1992, the FTC proceeded to 
prosecute numerous greenwashers under the FTC Act, using the 
Guides’ principles to support each claim.152 Defendants in these cases 
touted dubious environmental characteristics of products such as “plas-
c trti ash bags, disposable diapers, paper and plastic grocery store bags, 
other paper products, a snow-melting chemical, and various aerosol 
sprays.”153 In total, the FTC brought thirty-seven claims against alleged 
greenwashers in the 1990s.154 During the presidency of George W. 
Bush, however, from 2000 to 2009, that number dropped to zero.155 
 Since the change in administration, the FTC has become more 
willing to crack down on invalid green marketing again.156 In the past 
few years, the FTC brought a number of actions against greenwashers 
under the FTC Act, using the Green Guides as a framework.157 Adher-
ing to the Guides’ provision on biodegradable claims, the FTC pursued 
three companies—Kmart, Tender Corporation, and Dyna-E Interna-
tional—for deceptively marketing their products with the word “biode-
gradable.”158 According to the FTC, the defendants failed to qualify 
their claims with the caveat that the products in question were unlikely 
to break down completely when disposed of normally.159 Regarding the 
disposable disinfectant wipes marketed by Tender Corporation, the 
FTC relied on the second general principle set forth in the Green 
Guides, alleging Tender was not clear whether the “placement of the 
term ‘biodegr enced “the 
product, its pa he product or 
ack
adable’” on the product packaging refer
ckaging, or a portion or component of t
p aging.”160 In all three cases, the defendants ultimately agreed to 
discontinue their deceptive marketing schemes.161 
                                                                                                                      
152 See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Comm’r, FTC, A Brief Review of the FTC’s Environmental 
and Food Advertising Enforcement Programs (Oct. 13, 1995), available at http://www.ftc. 
gov/speeches/starek/rbsgre.shtm. 
153 Id. 
154 Redick, supra note 140. 
155 Id. 
156 See Bradley, supra note 29, at 41. 
157 See id. 
158 Id. (citing Kmart Corp., No. C-4263, 2009 FTC LEXIS 144 (F.T.C. July 15, 2009); 
Tender Corp., No. C-4261, 2009 FTC LEXIS 146 (F.T.C. July 13, 2009); Dyna-E Int’l, Inc., 
No. 9336, 2009 FTC LEXIS 229 (F.T.C. Dec. 15, 2009)). 
159 Bradley, supra note 29, at 41. 
160 Complaint at 1, Tender Corp., 2009 FTC LEXIS 146 (No. C-4261), 2009 FTC LEXIS 
148, at *2. 
161 See Kmart Corp., 2009 FTC LEXIS 144, at *3–4; Tender Corp., 2009 FTC LEXIS 
146, at *6; Dyna-E Int’l, Inc., 2009 FTC LEXIS 229, at *3–4. 
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C. State Law Incorporating the Green Guides 
 Consumers have further means of protection from greenwashing 
on the state level. Every state has its own consumer protection laws, in-
cluding “little FTC Acts,” which mirror the federal law against deceptive 
advertising.162 While only the FTC can bring claims under the federal 
tatus te, many of these corresponding state laws provide the advantage 
of consumer standing.163 Additionally, several states have enacted laws 
specifically aimed at misleading environmental marketing.164 Each 
green marketing law on the state level in some way incorporates the 
FTC’s Green Guides.165 
 Minnesota, for example, explicitly references the Green Guides in 
its own environmental marketing law.166 The statute thus creates en-
orcef able state law out of the FTC’s interpretive guidelines.167 Further, 
under the Minnesota statute, injured consumers have standing to bring 
private actions to enforce the Green Guides’ standards.168 Similarly, 
Maine’s Unfair Trade Practices Act requires conformity with the Green 
Guides to avoid violation.169 
 Other states, like New York and California, incorporate the Green 
Guides within their own specific environmental marketing statutes.170 
New York law creates a voluntary emblem system, enabling companies 
to market their products using a state-certified emblem only after meet-
ing strict standards based on the product and the type of environ-
mental claim.171 Those that do not choose to apply for the emblem still 
must adhere to the Green Guides whenever they use the words “recy-
cled,” “recyclable,” and “reusable.”172 California’s environmental mar-
                                                                                                                      
162 White, supra note 17, at 331; see, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17580.5 (West 
2008); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 2142 (2001); Minn. Stat. § 325E.41 (2010); N.Y. 
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 368.1 (2002). 
163 White, supra note 17, at 331. 
164 Id. at 332. 
165 Id. at 335; see Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17580.5; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, 
§ 2142; Minn. Stat. § 325E.41; N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 368.1. 
166 Minn. Stat. § 325E.41 (“Environmental marketing claims . . . must conform to the 
standards or be consistent with the examples contained in [the Green Guides].”). 
167 See id. 
168 Minn. Stat. § 8.31 (2010). 
169 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, § 2142 (2001). 
170 White, supra note 17, at 334; see N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 368.1 (2002); 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17580.5 (West 2008). 
171 White, supra note 17, at 334 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, §§ 368.1–
.7). 
172 N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 368.1 (“The use of the terms ‘recycled’, ‘recy-
clable’, and ‘reusable’ independent of the emblem must be in conformance with the 
[Green Guides].”). 
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keting statute similarly requires conformity to the Green Guides, but 
extends regulation to more general terms, such as “environmental 
choice” and “ecologically friendly.”173 Like many states, California al-
ji bottles does not “convey to a reasonable con-
plied a third-party seal of approval, despite the fact that it was created 
     
lows compliance with the Green Guides to serve as a defense against 
any suit brought under the state’s environmental marketing statute.174 
 California’s use of the Green Guides came into play in Hill v. Roll 
International Corp., in which a California consumer brought an action 
against the bottled water company Fiji for placing a green drop logo on 
its labels, giving the impression that its business practices were envi-
ronmentally sound.175 In fact, Fiji’s production process was environ-
mentally inferior to most bottling companies.176 Hill brought suit un-
der the California consumer protection law that incorporates the FTC’s 
greenwashing standards and invoked the “general environmental bene-
fit” principle of the Green Guides.177 The California Court of Appeal 
found, however, that Hill had not satisfied the reasonable consumer 
standard, also set out in the Guides.178 According to the court, the 
green drop logo on Fi
sumer in the circumstances that the product is endorsed for environ-
mental superiority.”179 
 In Koh v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., a consumer brought suit in the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under the 
same statute against the manufacturer of several household cleaning 
products for displaying a Greenlist label on its products.180 The label 
consisted of a drawing of two leaves and the words “Greenlist™ Ingre-
dients.”181 The logo was accompanied by language on the back of the 
packaging stating: “Greenlist™ is a rating system that promotes the use 
of environmentally responsible ingredients . . . .”182 The plaintiff 
claimed that the Greenlist emblem’s presentation on the bottles im-
                                                                                                                 
173 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17580(a), 17580.5 (also listing “‘earth friendly,’ ‘envi-
ronmentally friendly,’ ‘ecologically sound,’ ‘environmentally sound,’ ‘environmentally 
safe er like term”). 
17-2 (West 2006). 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 109, 111 (Ct. App. 2011). 
plication, that a product, package or service offers a general envi-
ron
(d) (2012). 
o. C-09-00927 RMW, 2010 WL 94265, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). 
,’ ‘ecologically safe,’ ‘environmentally lite,’ ‘green product,’ or any oth
174 Id. § 17580.5(b). See, e.g., Ind. Code Ann. § 24-5-
175 128 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 114–15 (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 260.7(a) (2011)) (“It is deceptive to misrepre-
sent, directly or by im
mental benefit.”). 
178 Id. at 115; see 16 C.F.R. § 260.1
179 Hill, 128 Cal Rptr. 3d at 116. 
180 See N
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
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by the manufacturer.183 In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, 
the court concluded that it was plausible that a reasonable consumer 
viewing the label in context would interpret it as originating from a 
third party.184 
he FTC 
ntiated, the update 
dvi
                                                                                                                     
D. 2012 Update to the Green Guides 
 In 2007, the FTC began the process of updating the Green Guides 
in response to changes in environmental marketing trends.185 After 
conducting several workshops and a study on consumer perception, the 
FTC published proposed revisions to the Guides in 2010.186 T
adopted those revisions as a final rule on October 11, 2012.187 
 The update covers a wider range of claims than the previous itera-
tion of the Guides, while leaving the general principles intact.188 In re-
sponse to issues like those in cases like Hill and Koh, the revision in-
cludes an additional section addressing environmental certifications 
and seals of approval.189 In addition to warning against false or unquali-
fied claims of third-party approval, the revisions stress that third-party 
seals fall under the FTC’s Endorsement Guidelines.190 Also, although 
the earlier version of the Guides allowed marketers to assert general 
environmental benefits as long as they were substa
a ses against such general, unqualified claims.191 
 The update retains the seven terms defined in the previous version 
of the Guides and adds five new types of claims: “renewable materials,” 
“renewable energy,” “non-toxic,” “carbon offset,” and “free-of” 
claims.192 Observing evidence of consumer confusion regarding the 
 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at *2. 
185 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 72 Fed. Reg. 66,091, 
66,091 (proposed Nov. 27, 2007) (requesting comments and announcing public meetings 
regarding the Green Guides); Cole & Goldstein, supra note 31. 
186 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. 63,552, 
63,552 (proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260) (proposing modifications 
and additions to the Guides). 
187 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,122 (Oct. 
11, 2012) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
188 Cole & Goldstein, supra note 31; see Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing 
Claims, 77 Fed. Reg. at 62,126–32; supra notes 143–149 and accompanying text. 
189 16 C.F.R. § 260.6 (2012). 
190 Id. § 260.6(b); see id. § 255 (providing guidance on the FTC Act’s application to 
third-party endorsements in advertising). 
191 Id. § 260.4(b) (“Because it is highly unlikely that marketers can substantiate all rea-
sonable interpretations of these claims, marketers should not make unqualified general 
environmental benefit claims.”). 
192 Id. §§ 260.5–.17. 
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phrase “made with renewable materials,” the FTC suggests that adver-
tisers qualify this claim with specific information about the materials 
used.193 Similarly, the FTC cited the evolving definition of “renewable 
energy,” and consumers’ association of the phrase with the absence of 
fossil fuels, in advising marketers to qualify such claims unless the use of 
fossil fuels is completely avoided in the production process.194 The up-
date’s added section on carbon offsets is limited, but warns against de-
ceptively advertising offsets that will not occur within two years or which 
are already required by law.195 
IV. Inadequacies of g Regulation and 
Potential Solutions 
A. Greenwashing Is a Ser adequately Addressed by 
y grow accus-
me
                                                                                                                     
 Current Greenwashin
ious Threat That Is In
Current Regulations 
 Greenwashing primarily hurts consumers who make purchasing 
decisions based on inaccurate environmental claims. Marketers who 
make unsubstantiated environmental claims can easily dupe consumers 
willing to pay a premium for ecologically beneficial products.196 Profit-
ing from misleading or false assertions of environmental benefit is un-
fair to consumers.197 Ultimately, continued greenwashing will cause 
consumers to become disillusioned and distrustful, as the
to d to treating green advertisements with suspicion.198 
 Greenwashing also undermines the potential environmental bene-
fits that the market for environmentally sound products creates.199 If 
companies are not held accountable for greenwashing, they will have 
little incentive to live up to the environmental claims asserted by their 
marketing departments.200 Rather than investing in the development of 
 
193 Id. § 260.16; see Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 63,552, 63,588 (proposed Oct. 15, 2010) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 260). 
194 Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 75 Fed. Reg. at 63,591 (stat-
ing that “the term ‘renewable energy’ has an emerging meaning,” but that “[t]here appears 
to be a consensus, however, that renewable energy excludes fossil fuels”); Northen, supra note 
141, at 117; see 16 C.F.R. § 260.16. 
195 16 C.F.R. § 260.5 (2012); Northen, supra note 141, at 117. 
196 See supra notes 18−66 and accompanying text. 
197 See Avallone, supra note 132, at 694. 
198 See Peter J. Tarsney, Note, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the Su-
preme Court’s Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 533, 537 (1994). 
199 See Israel, supra note 33 (“The free market system can have a positive effect on the 
environment only if manufacturers provide consumers with accurate information about 
the environmental impact of their purchasing decisions.”). 
200 See Avallone, supra note 132, at 695. 
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environmentally safe products and methods, companies will compete 
for the green-market share solely through advertising and promo-
tion.201 Consumers’ zeal for the environment is a potentially valuable 
resource; in the presence of unrestrained greenwashing, it would be 
wasted.202 Regulation is therefore necessary to deter companies that 
might attempt to capture the benefit of environmental marketing with-
rt of creating a comprehensive and effective system of 
rev
                                                                            
out investing in the environment itself. 
 Regulatory efforts from the private sector can only go so far in re-
ducing consumer confusion and holding companies accountable.203 
Environmental watchdogs do their part by educating consumers and 
making it more difficult for companies to mislead consumers without 
losing goodwill.204 Their actions, however, lack the uniformity and en-
forceability of government regulations.205 Third-party certification pro-
grams similarly lack the force of government-issued standards, and be-
cause they are not immune from private interests, their legitimacy is 
questionable.206 Although regulation by state and federal lawmakers 
begins to supplement the efforts by private efforts to curb greenwash-
ing, it falls sho
p ention.207 
 Among the various laws that apply to greenwashing, the Organic 
Foods Production Act (OFPA) and its accompanying National Organic 
Program (NOP) provide the strictest standards and enforcement, albeit 
with a very narrow scope.208 The NOP’s specifically defined regulations 
create a uniform national standard, providing clear notice to producers 
and importers so that they may choose whether or not to comply and 
receive organic certification.209 Further, by requiring periodic inspec-
tions, the OFPA actively polices farmers who claim to maintain organic 
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 agricultural industry’s failure to reach internal consensus regard-
ing 
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practices.210 Combining effective enforcement with well-defined re-
quirements makes it prohibitively costly for companies to advertise with 
the word “organic” without adhering to the U.S. Department of Agri-
culture’s (USDA) organic standards. Thus, consumer confusion as to 
which producers are in compliance is largely eliminated.211 Addition-
ally, the USDA’s organic seal lends a level of legitimacy to the compliant 
products that can rarely be achieved under nongovernmental pro-
grams.212 The NOP thus supplies both a carrot and a stick to encourage 
rga
to state and federal consumer protection 
istration, but their marketing strategies are 
                                                                                                                     
o nic practices and ensure accurate marketing claims. 
 Finite USDA resources and ability to enforce the OFPA limit the 
NOP’s strict regulation of organic products.213 Critics would like to see 
the USDA increase regulation in certain areas within the organic realm, 
such as foreign imports214 and synthetic additives,215 however the main 
provisions of the NOP largely prevent misuse of the term.216 Although 
the USDA effectively curbs false or inaccurate organic claims through 
the NOP, “organic” is the only term directly related to greenwashing 
that it oversees.217 Regulation of the wide range of environmental ad-
vertising that remains is left 
and unfair competition laws. 
 Although the Lanham Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act 
(“FTC Act”) include broad provisions regarding misleading advertise-
ments, both lack sufficient specificity and enforceability. Section 2(a) of 
the Lanham Act, for example, only prevents the registration of decep-
tive trademarks—a significant but incomplete roadblock for potential 
greenwashers.218 Companies barred under section 2(a) are denied the 
benefits of trademark reg
not otherwise affected.219 
 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act poses a more viable threat to 
greenwashers because of the potential imposition of damages or in-
junctive relief.220 Similarly, prosecution under section 5 of the FTC Act 
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can result in a fine or a cease-and-desist order.221 The inability of in-
jured consumers, however, to bring suits against greenwashers hampers 
consumer protection through section 43(a) and the FTC Act.222 De-
spite language in the Lanham Act that confers jurisdiction to “any per-
son who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such 
[false advertising],” courts consistently deny standing to consumers un-
der section 43(a).223 At the same time, standing under section 5 of the 
FTC Act is only granted to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and 
ot 
 can rely on corporations to police 
ne 
                                                                                                                     
n private citizens.224 
 The failure of either statute to provide consumer standing severely 
limits their effectiveness and fails to provide adequate protection to 
consumers.225 Without standing to sue, a consumer must wait for the 
FTC to act or for a competing business to bring claims against an al-
leged greenwasher.226 The FTC, however, is often slow to respond to 
the rapidly changing landscape of environmental marketing.227 FTC 
enforcement of green marketing standards is also subject to shifts in 
politics, as evidenced by the contrast in the quantity of FTC Guides for 
the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims (“Green Guides” or 
“Guides”) claims brought during the past three administrations.228 
Moreover, there is no guarantee that competitors asserting section 
43(a) claims are protecting consumer interests by doing so.229 It is dan-
gerous to assume that consumers
o another regarding deceptive marketing.230 
 Additionally, both the Lanham Act and the FTC Act lack the speci-
ficity and detail to adequately police environmental claims.231 Section 
43(a) in particular does not provide any specifics relating to environ-
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mental marketing; thus, judges and jurors must make subjective deter-
minations based on common sense or consumer surveys.232 Similarly, 
despite the existence of the Green Guides, courts often impose a rea-
sonable consumer standard for deceptive advertising under the FTC 
ct.2
ly accepted meanings of terms like “eco-friendly” or “sustain-
le
ent susceptible to the fluctuations of the 
                                                                                                                     
A 33 
 The negative consequences of subjective standards are twofold. 
First, the lack of clearly defined parameters causes uncertainty among 
companies engaged in green marketing as to what could be considered 
deceptive.234 Risk-averse companies may therefore choose to avoid 
green marketing altogether, even when their products are environmen-
tally superior. Second, appealing to the perspective of the reasonable 
consumer rather than carefully defined regulations creates a lax stan-
dard for greenwashing.235 The lack of consensus and clear definition in 
the realm of environmental marketing allows many marketers to slip 
through the reasonable consumer inquiry despite falsely suggesting or 
implying an environmental benefit.236 At the very least, parties who 
challenge greenwashers in court often face the difficult task of proving 
common
ab .”237 
 Finally, the FTC is limited to one-by-one pursuit of greenwashers 
because legislation restricts its ability to promulgate rules addressing 
specific issues related to deceptive advertising.238 This ad hoc enforce-
ment is discretionary and sporadic, and thus establishes little preceden-
tial case law.239 This approach adds further to the uncertainty of mar-
keters and makes enforcem
nation’s political climate.240 
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 The need for clarity and consistency in false advertising regula-
tions is what spurred the FTC to publish the Green Guides to aid busi-
nesses in engaging in lawful green marketing.241 The Guides provide 
increased specificity to greenwashing regulation, but lack enforceabil-
ity.242 They are a step in the right direction and the recent update adds 
further clarity, although it is too soon to tell to what extent the revision 
will aid enforcement.243 Apart from reducing the uncertainty of mar-
keters, however, the Guides do little to alleviate the deficiencies of the 
FTC Act.244 Because they are not binding law, the Guides do not instill 
any new powers in the FTC to prosecute greenwashing claims more ag-
gressively.245 Further, the fact that the new definitions of environmental 
terms are not positive law means that courts continue to apply the tra-
tio
prosecuted under 
combine the Guides’ framework of specifically defined terms with legal 
                                                                                                                     
di nal reasonable consumer standard, using the Green Guides only as 
a reference.246 
 Although the range of environmental terms is expansive, the 
Green Guides only define a select few.247 Even after the additions in the 
recent update, the collection of words and symbols left out remains 
daunting. Moreover, the revision of the Guides does not completely 
cure the pitfall of generality.248 While the updated Guides provide 
clearer definitions of what it means for claims to be “substantiated” or 
“deceptive,” companies cannot predict exactly how the FTC will inter-
pret these standards, because few cases have been 
either form of the Guides.249 Thus, the Green Guides fail to rescue 
companies and consumers alike from uncertainty.250 
 State consumer protection laws incorporating the Green Guides 
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enforceability and, in some states, the opportunity for consumer stand-
ing.251 Although these laws are often the most effective weapons for 
consumers against greenwashing, the variation from state to state cre-
ates new problems of inconsistency and inefficiency.252 Because of the 
lack of uniformity, national companies must be aware of and comply 
with fifty potentially unique standards.253 Even when states have 
adopted the same language from the Green Guides, in some cases the 
lack of precise definitions will result in varying interpretations.254 The 
prospect of applying a new standard in each state that a company oper-
ates in may raise expected costs prohibitively, so that some companies 
will choose to abstain from environmental marketing.255 This provides 
little incentive for companies to improve their environmental records. 
B.
ovation and investment in beneficial environmental 
rac
                                                                                                                     
Learning from Existing Regulations to Effectively Prevent Greenwashing 
 Moving forward, a new regulatory framework is required to ade-
quately address greenwashing. A new model should be developed after 
consideration of the advantages and shortcomings of the various laws 
previously discussed in this Note.256 The goal of this endeavor is to 
minimize consumer confusion and susceptibility to misleading advertis-
ing, and to allow consumers’ environmental awareness to power the 
market toward inn
p tices.257 
 First, it is important for the federal government to create uniform 
national standards to avoid the confusion and elevated costs of compli-
ance associated with state-by-state regulation.258 Next, a feasible and 
effective level of specificity must be achieved. The existing statutes im-
pose standards at various levels of precision.259 The USDA’s organic 
regime provides the most detailed requirements for the use of an envi-
ronmental term,260 while provisions in the Lanham Act and FTC Act 
present the broadest standards.261 The discussion above suggests that 
the USDA’s detailed approach is the most effective; however, regulation 
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of a wide array of environmental terms with the precision currently ac-
corded to the single word “organic” is unrealistic.262 Instead, the level 
of specificity in the Green Guides is the most feasible and appropriate 
oi
by providing consumers with more ac-
ra
 create a beneficial outcome by bringing issues 
to
creation of the Green Guides, the framework for this option is already 
                                                                                                                     
ch ce for future regulations.263 
 Unlike the Green Guides, however, these standards must be bind-
ing law to effectively reduce confusion and hold companies account-
able for their claims.264 A new regulatory scheme that includes binding 
standards as specific as those contained in the Guides would encourage 
the development of common practices in the business community for 
the benefit of the environment.265 Additionally, enforceable standards 
would help industry and the public agree on universally accepted defi-
nitions for covered terms, there
cu te purchasing information. 
 Future regulation of green marketing should also include con-
sumer standing as a safety valve for agencies that may be unresponsive 
to developing trends or lack the political will to enforce standards.266 In 
fact, the likely benefits of giving consumers the power to bring claims 
far outweigh the potential negative effects.267 Consumer standing could 
be used by individuals and environmental groups to assert the envi-
ronmental causes they feel most strongly about.268 Even unsuccessful 
consumer lawsuits can
in  the public eye.269 
 Scholars debate which governmental entity should take responsi-
bility for regulating environmental marketing.270 Those who suggest a 
combined effort of the FTC and EPA present the strongest argu-
ment.271 Because the FTC and EPA have already collaborated on the 
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in place.272 A collective regulatory effort would benefit from the EPA’s 
environmental expertise, while minimizing costs of transitioning from 
the current Green Guides to an enforceable standard.273 
 A potential solution to the growing problem of greenwashing 
would therefore take the form of a federal statute authorizing the FTC 
and EPA to promulgate binding standards for environmental market-
ing.274 Ideally, the regulations would give specific terms—such as com-
postable and degradable—bright line definitions, akin to the percent-
age requirements in the NOP.275 They would also enforce the 
prohibitions against vague, general assertions and third-party seals that 
are already established in the Green Guides.276 Finally, the new statute 
should include a consumer standing provision to allow consumers and 
environmentalists to pursue the alleged greenwashers they recognize as 
the most egregious.277 
Conclusion 
 Since emerging as a major trend in the late 1980s, environmental 
marketing has only continued to grow, and with it, the practice of 
greenwashing. Despite the Mobil controversy and the warnings of The 
Green Report, Congress has done little to curb the growing problem of 
deceptive environmental marketing. Existing laws are insufficient; uni-
form and specific federal regulations that provide consumer standing 
are necessary to adequately curb greenwashing. Such a scheme would 
protect consumers from unfairly paying for illusory environmental 
benefits. Moreover, it would allow environmentally conscious consumers 
to efficiently make their purchasing power felt, to the ultimate benefit 
of the environment. 
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